Derrida, Foucault and “Madness, the Absence of an Œuvre” by Seferin James
Seferin James / Derrida, Foucault and “Madness, the Absence of an Oeuvre” 
379 
 
 
META: RESEARCH IN HERMENEUTICS, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 
VOL. III, NO. 2 / DECEMBER 2011: 379-403, ISSN 2067-3655, www.metajournal.org 
 
 
 
Derrida, Foucault and  
“Madness, the Absence of an Œuvre”
1 
 
Seferin James  
University College Dublin 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article argues that Foucault's 1964 paper “La folie, l'absence d'œuvre” 
ought  to  be  understood  as  a  response  to  Derrida's  1963  paper  “Cogito  et 
histoire de la folie”. I clarify the chronology of the exchange between these 
two thinkers and follow commentators Bennington and Flynn in emphasising 
themes  other  than  the  status  of  madness  in  Descartes.  I  undertake  a 
thematic investigation of Foucault's 1961 characterisation of madness as the 
absence of an œuvre and the role of this characterisation in Derrida's 1963 
paper.  Then I  turn  to  an  investigation  of  Foucault's  substantial  change  in 
position on these key themes with his 1964 paper. I argue that Foucault seeks 
to  minimise  the  initial  importance  he  attributed  to  his  characterisation  of 
madness  as  the  absence  of  an  œuvre,  altering  his  understanding  of  the 
relation between madness and language as well as shifting the event that 
silences  madness  from  Descartes  to  Freud.  Derrida's  reconsideration  of 
Foucault's  Folie  et  déraison  in  1991  treats  Freud  as  the  new  locus  of  the 
exchange. This is an implicit recognition by Derrida of Foucault's “La folie, 
l'absence d'œuvre” and confirmation of its place within the exchange. 
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1.  Introduction  
   
Michel  Foucault  published  the  major  thesis  from  his 
doctoral  studies  in  1961  under  the  title  Folie  et  Déraison: 
Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique. In 1963 Jacques Derrida 
presented a paper at the Collège Philosophique titled “Cogito et 
histoire de la folie” that took Foucault's 1961 text as its point of 
departure (Derrida 1978, 36). Derrida notes in the opening lines 
of  his  paper  that  he  had  “the  good  fortune  to  study  under META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 
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Michel Foucault” (Derrida 1978, 36) and he is known to have 
sent  a  letter  formally  inviting  Foucault  to  attend  the 
presentation (Foucault 1994, 25).2  
  There  has  been  some  confusion  concerning  the  initial 
publication of Derrida's “Cogito et histoire de la folie.” It was 
published  in  the  1967  collection  L’Écriture  et  la  différence 
where a note mistakenly states that “Cogito et histoire de la 
folie” was originally published “in Revue de métaphysique et de 
morale, 1964, nos. 3 and 4” (Derrida 1978, 445n; Derrida 1964).3 
The  paper was  actually  first published  in  1963  in  the  fourth 
issue of Revue de Métaphysique et de morale. Derrida then had 
to wait until the next issue of the journal, the first of 1964, in 
order to publish a number of additional notes for the paper – “A 
propos de ‘Cogito et histoire de la folie’” – as correspondence to 
the journal. Derrida's “Cogito et histoire de la folie” first became 
available  in  English  as  “Cogito  and  the  History  of  Madness” 
(henceforth  CHM)  when  L’Écriture  et  la  différence  was 
translated by Alan Bass in 1978 as Writing and Difference. 
  Derrida  stated  in  a  footnote  to  the  initial  1963 
publication  that  “[w]ith  the  exception  of  several  notes  and  a 
short passage (in brackets), this paper is the reproduction of a 
lecture  given  4  March  1963  at  the  Collége  Philosophique” 
(Derrida  1978,  389n).4  Derrida  refers  to  material  inserted 
between square brackets for the 1963 publication that expands 
on  the  problematic  of  whether  the  Greeks  had  a  relation  to 
madness.5 When the paper was reproduced in L’Écriture et la 
différence this note was no longer accurate in stating that the 
paper remained the same as the one pronounced at the Collège 
Philosophique  apart  from  this  addition.  It  was  subject  to  an 
additional revision between its initial publication in 1963 and 
its subsequent publication in 1967.  
  The revision of “Cogito et histoire de la folie” between 
1963/4 and 1967 ought to be of some scholarly interest because 
it involves the question of Derrida's early writing of différance 
with an 'a'. Schultz and Fried, in their annotated bibliography 
of Derrida's work, refer to “Cogito et histoire de la folie” as the 
place where Derrida first writes différance with an 'a' (Schultz 
and Fried 1992, 12). The sentence referred to by Schultz and 
Fried  is  where  Derrida  writes  that  “[t]he  economy  of  this Seferin James / Derrida, Foucault and “Madness, the Absence of an Oeuvre” 
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writing is a regulated relationship between that which exceeds 
and the exceeded totality: the différance of the absolute excess” 
(Derrida 1978, 75).6 This statement is missing from the initial 
journal  publication  (Derrida  1963,  493)  and  must  have  been 
added during Derrida's revision between 1963 and 1967. It is 
therefore unclear whether Derrida first wrote différance with 
an 'a' in “Cogito et histoire de la folie.”  
  In  1964,  Foucault  was  approached  with  a  proposal  to 
republish his 1961 book in a popular edition. Against Foucault's 
wishes, this publication was to be “d'une édition très abrégée” 
(Foucault 1994, I, 26)7 retitled Histoire de la folie. This severely 
abridged  1964  edition  was  the  basis  for  Richard  Howard's 
translation  of  Foucault's  text  into  English,  published  as 
Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of 
Reason  in  1967  (Foucault  1967).  Among  the  many  sections 
excised in the 1964 abridgement is the passage on Descartes to 
which Derrida  had  explicitly  referred in  his  1963  paper.  The 
original  1961  Preface  –  where  Derrida  had,  in  Jean  Khalfa's 
words,  “concentrated  his  more  general  attack”  (Khalfa  2006, 
xxiii) – was cut to one third of its former size. This abridgement 
of the 1961 Preface removes some of the lines to which Derrida 
refers  in  “Cogito  et  histoire  de  la  folie”  but  some  of  the 
assertions that are most important to Derrida's argumentation 
were  retained.  Particularly,  Foucault's  statement  of  intent  to 
give a history of madness and to return to the originary division 
between reason and madness (Foucault 1964b, xi-xiii). 
  Foucault also published a short article in 1964 titled “La 
folie,  l'absence d'œuvre.” (Foucault  1964a)  Foucault will  later 
state that this article was intended to “expand on a phrase I 
ventured  rather  blindly:  'madness,  the  absence  of  an  œuvre'” 
(Foucault 2006e, xxxix). Khalfa states that it is in this article 
that Foucault “reformulates and develops some of the themes of 
the first Preface” (Khalfa 2006, xxiii).  
  Foucault  published  in  1972  a  new  edition  of  his  1961 
text under the title Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique. This 
text is commonly referred to as the second edition of Foucault's 
text,  but  such  a  characterisation  ignores  the  abridged  1964 
edition.  The  1972  text  is  also  commonly  referred  to  as  an 
unabridged  edition.  While  it  is  true  that  Foucault  almost META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 
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completely restores the material omitted from the 1964 edition 
for the 1972 edition, the single exception to this restoration is 
that the original 1961 Preface, having already been reduced by 
two thirds for the 1964 edition, is now removed completely for 
the 1972 edition. The omitted 1961 Preface is replaced with a 
short new 1972 Preface.  
  Foucault added two appendices to the 1972 edition. One 
of these is the 1964 article “La folie, l'absence d'œuvre.” The 
reformulation of material from the original 1961 preface in “La 
folie, l'absence d'œuvre” therefore replaces the original preface 
material  entirely  in  the  1972  edition.  The  second  appendix 
added  is  “Mon  corps,  ce  papier,  ce  feu.”8  Foucault  describes 
“Mon  corps,  ce  papier,  ce  feu”  as  “where  I  try  to  address  a 
remarkable  criticism  by  Derrida”  (Foucault  2006e,  xxxix). 
Foucault  responds  to  Derrida  on  the  matter  of  Descartes  in 
“Mon corps, ce papier, ce feu” and this means that the passage 
on Descartes omitted from the 1964 edition is restored to the 
1972 edition alongside a new defence of that passage against 
Derrida.9  
  Geoffrey Bennington translated “Mon corps, ce papier, ce 
feu” into English in 1979 as “My Body, this Paper, This Fire,” 
(Foucault 2006c) shortly after the 1978 translation of Derrida's 
“Cogito et histoire de la folie.” Foucault's defence of the original 
passage  on  Descartes  against  Derrida  was  therefore  made 
available in English many years before the original passage to 
which Derrida had actually referred.  
  The 1972 edition was eventually translated into English 
in 2006 by Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa, and published 
as the History of Madness.10 This is the first complete edition of 
the text to appear in English. It is actually more complete than 
the 1972 edition upon which it is based as it also includes the 
original 1961 preface. The event of its publication is the first 
time that the unabridged 1961 preface and the original 1961 
passage on Descartes have appeared in English. It is also the 
first time that Foucault's 1964 paper and 1972 appendix “La 
folie,  l'absence  d'œuvre”  has  been  translated;  “Madness,  the 
Absence  of  an  Œuvre”  (Foucault  2006b,  541-9,  henceforth 
MAO).  Seferin James / Derrida, Foucault and “Madness, the Absence of an Oeuvre” 
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  Derrida presented once more on Foucault's 1961 text at 
a conference marking the thirtieth anniversary of its original 
publication  in  1991.  Derrida's  paper  was  published  in  a 
collection of papers from that conference in 1992 as “'Etre juste 
avec  Freud':  l'histoire  de  la  folie  à  l’âge  psychanalytique.” 
(Derrida 1992) The paper was then translated into English by 
Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas and published in 1994 
as “'To Do Justice to Freud': The History of Madness in the Age 
of Psychoanalysis.” (Derrida 1994) 
 
2.   “La folie, l'absence d'œuvre” 
 
  The  exchange  between  Derrida  and  Foucault  has 
attracted a considerable amount of commentary and attention 
(See Bennington 1979; Boyne 1990; Brague 2002; Cook 1990; 
D'Amico 1984; Felman 1975; Flaherty 1986; Flynn 1989; Frank 
1989; Harrison 2007; Kates 2005; Norris 1987, 213-223; Spivak 
1976,  lx-lxii;  Switzer  2010;  Wood  2009,  46-59;  Žižek  2007).11 
While  Foucault's  original  characterisation  of  madness  as  the 
absence  of  an  œuvre  in  the  1961  Preface  has  received  some 
attention (See Bennington 1979; Flynn 1989), the commentary 
on the exchange has been almost completely silent on MAO.  
  Only  Shoshana  Felman's  article  “Madness  and 
Philosophy or Literature's Reason” refers to MAO in the context 
of  a  consideration  of  the  exchange  between  Derrida  and 
Foucault  (Felman  1975,  224).  Felman  quotes  one  brief 
statement from MAO in order to illustrate Foucault's literary 
understanding  of  madness  but  does  not  undertake  an 
exposition of the paper or comment generally on the relation of 
this paper to the exchange.  
  Foucault and Derrida never explicitly identified MAO as 
an important part of their exchange. Foucault does not refer to 
Derrida in MAO and describes “Mon corps, ce papier, ce feu” as 
where  he  responds  to  Derrida  (Foucault  1972,  „Préface”). 
Foucault's response to Derrida in “Mon corps, ce papier, ce feu” 
is largely restricted to the question over the status of madness 
in  Descartes.  This  has  been  noted  by  Bennington  (1979,  5-7) 
and Flynn (1989, 201).  META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 
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  Flynn  writes  that  “[t]he  basis  of  Derrida's  critique  of 
Foucault  is  hardly  the  pedantic  concern  that  Descartes's  First 
Meditation may have been misread in a passage that occupies less 
than  4  pages  of  a  673-page  book”  (Flynn  1989,  201).12  Flynn's 
point here is somewhat overstated because Derrida does contest 
the question of madness in Descartes but he is correct to highlight 
the  limitations  of  a  sole  emphasis  on  this  aspect  of  the 
argumentation.  Derrida  spends  the  first  half  of  CHM  –  some 
twenty  pages  –  opening  a  number  of  questions  over  Foucault's 
intentions  and  methodology  before  broaching  the  specifics  of 
Foucault's interpretation of the status of madness in Descartes.  
  Derrida relies on material from Foucault's 1961 preface in 
this first half of CHM, as Khalfa correctly points out (Khalfa 2006, 
xxiii). Khalfa also notes that Foucault reformulates themes from 
the 1961 Preface in MAO (Khalfa 2006, xxiii) but it does not seem 
to  occur  to  him  that  these  points  might  be  combined  into  the 
question  that  I  intend  to  raise  here.  The  question  of  whether 
Foucault's MAO ought to be considered some kind of reaction or 
response to Derrida's CHM.  
  Having  already  situated  MAO  within  a  clarified 
chronology of the exchange between Derrida and Foucault, I now 
propose to undertake a thematic consideration of Foucault's 1961 
characterisation  of  madness  as  the  absence  of  an  œuvre  and 
examine the role it plays for Derrida's argumentation in CHM. On 
the basis of this thematic exploration it becomes possible to show 
that Foucault not only addresses the same thematic concerns in 
MAO as those raised by Derrida in the first half of CHM but also 
that (a) Foucault alters his 1961 position on the question of how 
madness  relates  to  language,  and  (b)  dramatically  shifts  his 
emphasis from Descartes to Freud.  
 
3.  Foucault's initial characterisation  
of madness as the absence of an œuvre and 
Derrida's interest in this 
 
  In the original 1961 preface Foucault poses the question: 
“What then is madness, in its most general but most concrete 
form,  for  anyone  who  immediately  challenges  any  hold  that 
knowledge might have upon it?” Foucault answers by asserting Seferin James / Derrida, Foucault and “Madness, the Absence of an Oeuvre” 
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that  madness  is  “[i]n  all  probability,  nothing  other  than  the 
absence of an œuvre” (Foucault 2006d, xxxi). These statements 
are  omitted  in  the  abridgement  of  the  preface  for  the  1964 
edition but it is in relation to this that Derrida states in “Cogito 
and the History of Madness” that “madness is what by essence 
cannot  be  said:  it  is  the  'absence  of  the  work,'  as  Foucault 
profoundly  says”  (Derrida  1978,  CHM  51).13  Derrida  accepts 
Foucault's assertion that madness is the absence of an œuvre 
and recognises it as “a fundamental motif of Foucault's book.” 
(Derrida 1978, CHM 65). 
  Foucault's assertion that madness is the absence of an 
œuvre is associated with a number of arguments in Foucault's 
text and Derrida does not treat of them all equally. Madness as 
the  absence  of  an  œuvre  is  (1)  the  historical  identification  of 
those who could not work among the incarcerated poor during 
the  great  confinement;  (2)  the  absence  of  a  body  of  work 
representing madness as madness; (3) that which makes history 
possible.  
  (1)  The  assertion  that  madness  is  the  absence  of  an 
œuvre  refers  to  how  madness  emerged  as  a  way  of 
characterising  the  poor  who  could  not  work  during  the  great 
confinement. Foucault states of the mad that: 
Like  the  poor,  they  were subject  to  the  rule  of  compulsory  labour, 
indeed  in  many  cases  the  singularity  of  their  condition  became 
perceptible  against  the  uniformity  of  this  constraint.  In  the 
workshops where they were expected to blend in with the others, they 
often  signalled  themselves  through  their  inability  to  work  and  to 
follow the rhythms of collective life. (Foucault 2006a, 71) 
For  Foucault,  madness  initially  emerges  historically  as  a 
characterisation of the poor who could not work or who produce 
nothing. The term madness is first deployed historically as the 
recognition of the absence of an œuvre in this sense.14 Derrida 
pays no obvious attention to this aspect of Foucault's assertion 
except insofar as the inability of the mad to engage in physical 
labour might be linked to the inability of the mad to create a 
written  œuvre.  Such  a  link  can  be  identified  in  Derrida's 
opening allusion to Hegel in CHM in which he undertakes a 
textual reformulation of the master slave dialectic. In Derrida's 
reformulation,  the  work  that  fosters  the  development  of  the META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 
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disciple's  self-consciousness  is  the  task  of  beginning  to  speak 
and the production of the text.  
  (2) Madness as the absence of an œuvre also refers to the 
absence of a body of work representing madness as madness. 
Foucault states: 
There  is  no  common  language:  or  rather,  it  no  longer  exists;  the 
constitution  of  madness  as  mental  illness,  at  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth century, bears witness to a rupture in a dialogue, gives 
the separation as already enacted, and expels from the memory all 
those  imperfect  words,  of  no  fixed  syntax,  spoken  falteringly,  in 
which the exchange between madness and reason was carried out. 
The language of psychiatry, which is a monologue by reason about 
madness, could only have come into existence in such a silence. My 
intention was not to write the history of that language, but rather 
draw up the archaeology of that silence. (Foucault 2006d, xxviii) 
Here Foucault argues that there was a prelapsarian time before 
discourse  was  divided  into  mad  discourse  on  one  hand  and 
reasonable  discourse  on  the  other.  The  mad  discourse  is 
silenced and in this silence arises a monologue by reason about 
madness; a monologue that attempts to define and categorise 
madness,  but  in  applying  such  reasonable  ways  of  knowing 
never understands madness madly. For Foucault this is related 
to  the  constitution  of  madness  as  madness  because  “[t]he 
gesture that divides madness is the constitutive one”. (Foucault 
2006d,  xxviii)  The  silence  that  results  from  this  division  is 
madness as the absence of an œuvre. 
  Derrida  accepts  Foucault’s  assertion,  but  uses  it  to 
problematise the possibility of Foucault's text. Derrida argues 
that:  
Foucault has attempted – and this is the greatest merit, but also the 
very infeasibility of his book – to write a history of madness itself. 
Itself. Of madness itself. That is, by letting madness speak for itself. 
Foucault wanted madness to be the subject of his book in every sense 
of  the  word:  its  theme  and  its  first-person  narrator,  it's  author, 
madness speaking about itself. Foucault wanted to write a history of 
madness  itself,  that  is  madness  speaking  on  the  basis  of  its  own 
experience and under its own authority, and not a history of madness 
described from within the language of reason. (Derrida 1978, CHM 
39) 
Derrida identifies Foucault's ambition to let madness speak for 
itself  as  the  desire  to  give  madness  an  œuvre.  Foucault's Seferin James / Derrida, Foucault and “Madness, the Absence of an Oeuvre” 
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assertion  that  madness  is  the  absence  of  an  œuvre  then 
becomes  a  pivotal  point,  because  Foucault's  work  will  either 
actually  be  a  work  and  hence  a  work  of  reason  that  fails  to 
allow  madness  speak  for  itself,  or  will  fail  in  such  a  drastic 
manner that it cannot be considered a work at all.  
  Foucault's  intention  is  to  create  a  work  of  madness 
without falling into the trap that Derrida argues it necessarily 
leads to. Foucault believes that it is possible to avoid this trap 
by returning to:  
[A] language more original, much rougher and more matutinal than 
that  of  science,  the  dialogue  of  their  rupture,  which  proves,  in  a 
fleeting  fashion,  that  they  are  still  on  speaking  terms.  There, 
madness  and  non-madness,  reason  and  non-reason  are  confusedly 
implicated in each other, inseparable as they do not yet exist, and 
existing for each other. (Foucault 2006d, xxviii) 
Foucault believes that it is in this undivided language, where 
madness and reason are not yet separated, that his 1961 text is 
written.  The  ability  to  characterise  language  in  this  way  is 
therefore very important for Foucault. 
  Derrida challenges Foucault's ability to utilise such an 
undivided language. Derrida argues that: 
The  misfortune  of  the  mad,  the  interminable  misfortune  of  their 
silence, is that their best spokesmen are those who betray them best; 
which is to say that when one attempts to convey their silence itself, 
one  has  already  passed  over  to  the  side  of  the  enemy,  the  side  of 
order, even if one fights against order from within it. (Derrida 1978, 
CHM 42) 
Derrida  concludes  that  Foucault's  attempt  to  create  a  work, 
especially  a  history,  without  a  rational  is  ultimately  naïve. 
Derrida  asks  rhetorically:  “is  not  an  archaeology,  even  of 
silence,  a  logic,  that  is,  an  organized  language,  a  project,  an 
order, a sentence, a syntax, a work?” (Derrida 1978, CHM 41) 
Derrida argues that “the work starts with the most elementary 
discourse” (Derrida 1978, CHM 65). Derrida's argument is that 
a  rationality  of  some  kind  is  intrinsic  to  language  itself.  He 
argues  that  FD  cannot  be  a  work  of  madness  as  Foucault 
desires, but is instead yet another work of reason. This is the 
core political  charge  of  Derrida's  CHM:  that Foucault  is only 
imprisoning madness in a more subtle way by denouncing its META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 
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imprisonment in a work that is itself inescapably reasonable, 
even if it is only separated from madness “by the 'transparent 
sheet'  of  which  Joyce  speaks”  (Derrida  1978,  CHM  66)  when 
Joyce  writes  of  Ulysses  that  “[i]n  any  event  this  book  was 
terribly  daring.  A  transparent  sheet  separates  it  from 
madness.” (Derrida 1978, CHM 36). 
  With this in mind, Derrida asks the cutting question of 
Foucault's text, “[w]ould not the archaeology of silence [i.e. of 
madness]  be  the  most  efficacious  and  subtle  restoration,  the 
repetition, in the most irreducibly ambiguous meaning of the 
word, of the act perpetrated against madness – and be so at the 
very moment when this act is denounced?” (Derrida 1978, CHM 
41). This is the most embarrassing question that Derrida asks 
of  Foucault  in  CHM  because  it  deflates  the  moral  tone  and 
liberationary aspirations of FD. Foucault sought to emancipate 
madness, but Derrida argues that all he can do is denounce the 
crime of its incarceration while repeating it.  
  Derrida argues that Foucault's naivety in believing that 
it  is  possible  to  escape  the  ordered  nature  of  language 
effectively causes his project to default to a situation in which 
Foucault can be said to have created a non-work of madness: 
“Foucault's determination to avoid this trap is constant. It is 
the  most  audacious  and  seductive  aspect  of  his  venture, 
producing  its  admirable  tension.  But  it  is  also,  with  all 
seriousness, the maddest aspect of his project.” (Derrida 1978, 
CHM 40) For Derrida, Foucault's text can only be considered a 
work  of  madness  because  the  work  is  unaware  of  its  own 
impossibility.  Foucault's  work  could  not  have  been  mad  if  it 
knowingly  deployed  a  strategy  of  impossibility.  It  is  only 
because Foucault does not realise that his project must fail so 
that it can, somewhat paradoxically, succeed. Derrida informs 
Foucault that he has only succeeded in spite of himself.15 
  (3) For Foucault, the absence of an œuvre is also what 
must be considered in order to come to terms with the full truth 
of our society. He argues that: 
[T]hose  obscure  gestures  [...]  through  which  a  culture  rejects 
something  which  for  it  will  be  the  Exterior;  and  throughout  its 
history, this hollowed-out void, this white space by means of which it 
isolates itself, identifies it as clearly as its values. [...] To interrogate 
a culture about its limit-experience is to question it at the confines of Seferin James / Derrida, Foucault and “Madness, the Absence of an Oeuvre” 
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history  about  a  tear  that  is  something  like  the  very  birth  of  its 
history. (Foucault 2006d, xxix)  
Here Foucault claims that what a society forces outside of itself 
creates the exterior that defines the interior of that society as 
much  as  what  that  society  claims  to  stand  for.  This  point  is 
further developed by Foucault when he writes that:  
The great œuvre of the history of the world is indelibly accompanied 
by the absence of an œuvre, which renews itself at every instant, but 
which runs unaltered in its inevitable void the length of history: and 
from before history, as it is already there in the primitive decision, 
and  after  it  again,  as  it  will  triumph  in  the  last  word  uttered  by 
history. The plenitude of history is only possible in the space, both 
empty  and  peopled  at  the  same  time,  of  all  the  words  without 
language ... The charred root of meaning. (Foucault 2006d, xxxii)16 
Foucault argues that the work of society, its history, is linked to 
its  non-work,  its  non-history.  Foucault  wishes  to  consider 
society  from  both  sides  of  the  delimitation  that  makes  it  the 
society  that  it  is,  with  the  intention  of  coming  to  a  more 
profound understanding of it than would otherwise be possible. 
Though such an understanding would be more profound than a 
consideration  of  society  that  only  operates  on  the  reasonable 
side of that limit, Foucault argues that it is actually necessary 
to understanding in general: 
The necessity of madness throughout the history of the West is linked 
to that decisive action that extracts a significant language from the 
background noise and its continuous monotony, a language which is 
transmitted  and  culminates  in  time;  it  is,  in  short,  linked  to  the 
possibility of history. (Foucault 2006d, xxxii) 
Foucault holds that it is necessary for understanding in general 
to understand the absence of an œuvre. It has become a matter 
of the possibility and constitution of meaning in general and as 
such, that is to say of the transcendental in a Husserlian sense. 
  Derrida  is  aware  of  implicit  problems  for  Foucault's 
project in this understanding of the absent œuvre as that which 
makes history possible. Derrida argues that if this separation 
between madness and reason is a condition of “the historicity of 
history”  (Derrida  1978,  CHM  51),  then  the  event  of  the 
separation of madness and reason – what Foucault considers 
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runs contrary to Foucault's attempt to historicise this event in 
his  1961  text  such  as  when,  for  example,  he  refers  to  the 
separation  of  madness  and  reason  taking  place  during  a 
particular  time  frame:  “[a]fter  defusing  its  violence,  the 
Renaissance  had  liberated  the  voice  of  Madness.  The  age  of 
reason, in a strange takeover, was then to reduce it to silence” 
(Foucault  2006a,  44).  Derrida's  point  here  is  somewhat 
confusing. He may appear to be arguing that the separation of 
madness and reason is pre-historical but this is not the case.  
  Archaeology can give a history of a time before historical 
records by examining, for example, remains from the neolithic 
period. This might lead one to conclude that it is possible to 
give  an  account  of  a  pre-historical  event.  Such  a  conclusion 
would  fail  to  realise  that  the  term  pre-historical  implies 
temporality in a historical sense. To attempt to talk of the pre-
historical is to historicise history itself and this is, inevitably, a 
historical  gesture.  Derrida  is  not  arguing  that  the  birth  of 
history is pre-historical (a historical understanding) but rather 
that  the  birth  of  history  is  irrecoverable  to  any  historical 
gesture. It is not a matter of history but of historicity; of history 
qua  history,  of  the  historicalness  of  history,  of  that  which 
makes history as such possible but is not itself historical. 
  Derrida  states  that  “Like  nonmeaning,  silence  is  the 
work's  profound  limit  and  resource.”  (Derrida  1978,  CHM  66) 
This resonates positively with Foucault's assertion that madness 
is  the  absence  of  an  œuvre  that  necessarily  accompanies  the 
actual œuvre. It is relatively straightforward to understand that 
silence is the limit of the work when this is understood to mean 
that  silence  is  the  limit  of  language.  For  Derrida,  this silence 
would not only be the absence of speech but also the absence of 
the written mark. It is not itself a mark, but nevertheless this 
non-mark  still  produces  a  difference  between  the  marking  of 
language and the non-marking of non-language. 
  Silence  produces  the  limits  of  the  work  and  hence 
defines and determines the specificity of the work as the work it 
actually is. It operates at every level of a text – every grapheme 
takes  shape  in  ink  against  the  blankness  of  the  page  and 
Foucault's work takes shape against the absence of an œuvre. 
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that  the  “great œuvre of  the  history  of  the world  is indelibly 
accompanied by the absence of an œuvre, which renews itself at 
every instant” (Foucault 2006d, xxxii) Derrida's concludes that 
madness is not excluded from the cogito in the name of reason 
because  madness  is  what  exceeds  the  form  of  any  ordered 
determination  of  the  cogito.  The  blankness  of  the  page  will 
always  exceed  whatever  is  written  upon  it,  making  what  is 
written possible but never exhausting itself in the taking place 
of writing. Silence is the condition of possibility for the work but 
it is not a resource. 
  This sense of madness as the absence of an œuvre is very 
close to what Derrida will come to term différance. The proximity 
of Derrida's consideration of madness as the absence of an œuvre 
to  différance  is  evidenced  by  Derrida's  revision  of  “Cogito  et 
histoire de la folie” to include this term for its 1967 republication 
in  L'Ecriture  et  la  difference.  It  is  also  evidenced  in  the 
prominence given to the motif of silence in Derrida's discussion of 
différance in La voix et le phénomène.17 Having  established the 
role of Foucault's 1961 characterisation of madness as the absence 
of an œuvre in relation to Derrida's 1963 argumentation, I now 
move to consider Foucault's reformulation of these themes in his 
1964 paper. 
 
4.  Foucault's 1964 paper “Madness, the Absence  
of an Œuvre” 
 
  Foucault's MAO departs from his 1961 text substantially 
in  relation  to  the  themes  considered  in  the  previous  section. 
There  is  also  a  shift  in  style  and  methodology  away  from 
history, marked by the adoption of a prophetic tone. Foucault 
offers  a  new  schematisation  of  how  madness  relates  to 
language,  one  that  is  markedly  different  from  his  earlier 
statements.  Finally,  the  matter  of  the  strange  violent  event 
that  was  said  in  1961  to  have  taken place  at  the  end  of  the 
renaissance  and  the  beginning  of  the  classical  age  is  shifted 
from Descartes to Freud with dramatic implications. 
  Foucault's 1961 discussion of madness as the absence of 
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history but he discusses madness as the absence of an œuvre 
without mentioning history in MAO: 
[A]  prodigious  reserve  of  meaning.  But  'reserve'  here  should  be 
understood  less  as  a  stock  than  as  a  figure  that  contains  and 
suspends meaning, which furnishes a void where all that is proposed 
is the still unaccomplished possibility that a certain meaning might 
appear there, or a second, or a third, and so on to infinity. (Foucault 
2006b, MAO 547) 
Instead  of  a  history  there  is  now  prophecy.  The  still 
unaccomplished  possibility;  the  not  yet  said  of  madness;  the 
messianic promise of a future meaning.  
  Foucault opens MAO with the future oriented statement 
that “[o]ne day, perhaps, we will no longer know what madness 
was. Its form will have closed up on itself, and the traces it will 
have left will no longer be intelligible” (Foucault 2006b, MAO 
541).  This  quotation  implies  that  madness  is  presently  still 
intelligible  in  some  way,  or  at  least  potentially  intelligible, 
because there may come a time when it will no longer be so. 
And  yet  madness  cannot  have  been  absolutely  silenced  by  a 
historical  event,  as  claimed  in  the  1961  preface,  if  it  is  still 
potentially intelligible today.  
  Potential intelligibility implies potential communicability, 
and  therefore  language  in  the  broadest  sense  –  and  madness 
cannot then be silence and the absence of an œuvre. The exclusion 
and silencing of madness is no longer to be considered a historical 
event  at  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century  but  rather  a 
threatening future possibility. It also suggests that it is possible to 
escape  the  relationship  to  madness  that  Foucault  insists  our 
putatively reasonable society is currently incapable of escaping. 
Would this not constitute another mysterious event of comparable 
importance to that which originally silenced madness but left our 
society  in  a  relationship  with  this  silence,  this  exclusion? 
Something must surely change in order for our society to be able 
to  escape  the  already  inescapable  relationship  to  that  which  it 
already so vehemently denies. 
  Foucault continues his 1964 article by stating that “To 
the  ignorant  glance,  will  those  traces  be  anything more  than 
simple  black  marks?”  (Foucault  2006b,  MAO  541).  Foucault 
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These  black  marks  appear  to  be  an  allusion  to  writing  but 
perhaps a writing that is not recognised as such. A language 
that is no longer recognised as significant. There is again an 
orientation towards the future in Foucault's question here. If 
making  broad  philosophical  claims  concerning  the  empirical 
past  has  become  a  problem  for  Foucault's  project,  then  his 
project will abandon history to dispute the future.  
  Foucault's characterisation of madness as black marks 
that cannot be understood by an ignorant glance implies that 
madness is still a language even if it is not understood as such. 
Rather than madness being excluded from language, madness 
is now a language that is no longer recognised as meaningful. 
Madness is no longer simply reduced to silence by a historical 
event. It is now as if society simply stopped caring to listen.  
  Foucault  makes  a  distinction  in  MAO  between  the 
prohibition of acts and prohibitions within language: 
The  systems  that  forbidden  acts  obey  are  familiar  [...]  But  the 
organisation of prohibitions in language is still little understood. The 
two systems of restriction are not superimposed the one on the other, 
as though one were merely the verbal version of the other [...] One 
day it will be necessary to study the field of prohibitions in language 
in all its autonomy. (Foucault 2006b, MAO 545)  
This  distinction  is  not  a  dichotomy.  Foucault  states  that 
madness “long occupied an undecided region, which is difficult 
for us to define, between the prohibition of action and that of 
language” (Foucault 2006b, MAO 545-6). Focusing on language 
allows  Foucault  to  discern  four  codes  of  prohibition  within 
language: 
[1]  First  of  all,  at  the  border  between  taboo  and  impossibility,  we 
should identify the laws that govern the linguistic code (the things 
that are called, so clearly, language faults); [2] and then, within the 
code,  and  among  the  words  or  existing  expressions,  those  whose 
articulation  is  forbidden  (the  religious,  sexual,  magic  series  of 
blasphemous words); [3] then the statements that are authorised by 
the code, licit in the act of speech, but whose meaning is intolerable 
for the culture in question at a given moment: here a metaphorical 
detour is no longer possible, for it is the meaning itself which is the 
object of censorship. [4] Finally, there is a fourth form of excluded 
language:  this  consists  of  submitting  speech  that  apparently 
conforms  to  the  recognised  code  to  a  different  code,  whose  key  is 
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inside itself; it says what it says, but it adds a mute surplus that 
silently states what it says and the code according to which it is said. 
This is not a question of coded language, but of a language that is 
structurally esoteric. Which is to say that it does not communicate, 
while hiding it, a forbidden meaning; it sets itself up from the very 
first instant in an essential fold of speech. (Foucault 2006b, MAO 545 
numbering added) 
Foucault then states that “[i]n Western history, the experience 
of madness has shifted along this scale” (Foucault 2006b, MAO 
545).  
  The first three of these codes of prohibition are relatively 
straightforward and Foucault gives examples of how madness is 
subject to each:  
[M]adness is the excluded language – [1] the one which against the 
code of language pronounces words without meaning (the 'insane', the 
'imbeciles', the 'demented'), [2] or the one which pronounces sacred 
words (the 'violent', the 'frenzied'), [3] or the one which puts forbidden 
meanings  into  circulation  ('libertines',  the  'obstinate').  (Foucault 
2006b, MAO 546 [numbers added]) 
Of the fourth code of prohibition in language Foucault states that 
this “modification only really came about with Freud” (Foucault 
2006b,  MAO  546).  Foucault  therefore  associates  this  code  of 
prohibition  with  the  development  of  psychoanalysis,  and  this 
may allow one to begin to understand the otherwise mysterious 
character of this fourth code of language prohibition.  
  Foucault explains that this psychoanalytic modification 
of language prohibition: 
[A]ppeared as speech wrapped up in itself, saying, below everything 
that it says, something else, for which it is at the same time the only 
possible  code:  an  esoteric  language  perhaps,  since  its  language  is 
contained  inside  a  speech  that  ultimately  says  nothing  other  than 
this implication. (Foucault 2006b, MAO 546) 
Madness is therefore speech that “says nothing other than this 
implication” of something else, that is itself not actually said. 
Mad  speech  says  nothing  other  than  carrying  the  unspoken 
implication that the speaker is mad.  
  This ability of mad speech to say nothing other than this 
mute  implication  of  madness,  regardless  of  what  is  actually 
said, makes madness for Foucault:  Seferin James / Derrida, Foucault and “Madness, the Absence of an Oeuvre” 
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[A]  prodigious  reserve  of  meaning.  But  'reserve'  here  should  be 
understood  less  as  a  stock  than  as  a  figure  that  contains  and 
suspends meaning, which furnishes a void where all that is proposed 
is the still unaccomplished possibility that a certain meaning might 
appear there, or a second, or a third, and so on to infinity. (Foucault 
2006b, MAO 547) 
Madness is conveyed mutely by implication, but it never plainly 
reveals  itself  regardless  of  what  is  actually  said.  Madness  is 
never yet said and in this there is a messianic promise that it 
might  be  revealed  in  future  –  “the  still  unaccomplished 
possibility that a certain meaning might appear” – yet any actual 
revelation will not be madness itself, which still cannot itself be 
said as long as this code remains in effect.  
  The  fourth  code  of  language  prohibition  thus  takes  on 
the whole significance of madness as the absence of an œuvre. 
Foucault writes that: 
Since Freud, Western madness has become a non-language because it 
has become a double language (a language which only exists in this 
speech, a speech that says nothing but its language) – i.e. a matrix of 
the  language  which,  strictly  speaking,  says  nothing.  A  fold  of  the 
spoken which is an absence of work.  
One day, it will have to be acknowledged that Freud did not make 
speak a madness that had genuinely been a language for centuries (a 
language  that  was  excluded,  garrulous  inanity,  speech  which  ran 
indefinitely outside the reflective silence of reason); what he did was 
silence the unreasonable Logos; he dried it out; he forced its words 
back to their source, all the way back to that blank region of auto-
implication where nothing is said. (Foucault 2006b, MAO 547) 
Foucault's strategy in MAO is therefore to create a distinction 
between  the  prohibition  of  acts  and  prohibitions  in  language, 
while arguing that madness is located in a region difficult to 
define between these two kinds of prohibitions; then he briefly 
describes four kinds of prohibition in language, while arguing 
that madness has shifted through these as a scale; then he links 
the fourth type of prohibition in language to Freud, and finally 
proffers this code of prohibition as the meaning of madness as 
the absence of an œuvre.  
  Foucault's  strategy  in  reformulating  this  key  phrase  –
remember  that  he  stated  in  the  1961  preface  “What  then  is 
madness... In all probability, nothing other than the absence of 
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centrality to his understanding of madness. The absence of an 
œuvre is no longer the answer to the question “What then is 
madness” (Foucault 2006d, xxxi), but only a subset of a greater 
subset  of  the  answer  to  this  question.  Moreover,  Foucault 
attempts to transform the phrase from a key tenet of his own 
project – the answer to the question “[w]hat is madness ... for 
anyone who immediately challenges any hold that knowledge 
might have upon it?” (Foucault 2006d, xxxi) – to a phrase that 
merely describes what Freud has done to madness.  
  In  Folie  et  déraison,  Foucault  writes  that  “[a]fter 
defusing its violence, the Renaissance had liberated the voice of 
Madness. The age of reason, in a strange act of force, was then 
to reduce it to silence.” (Foucault 2006a, 44) Whereas in MAO 
Foucault writes that (repeating this quotation):  
Freud  did  not  make  speak  a  madness  that  had  genuinely  been  a 
language  for  centuries  (a  language  that  was  excluded,  garrulous 
inanity, speech which ran indefinitely outside the reflective silence of 
reason); what he did was silence the unreasonable Logos; he dried it 
out; he forced its words back to their source, all the way back to that 
blank  region  of  auto-implication  where  nothing  is  said.  (Foucault 
2006b, MAO 547) 
Freud  finally  dries  madness  out  by  making  the  unconscious 
nothing  of  madness  meaningful  through  psychoanalysis. 
Madness  therefore  appears  to  be  a  language  for  Foucault  in 
1964  until  Freud  silences  it.  Foucault  states  that  up  to  this 
point madness was a language in spite of it being 'excluded' and 
considered 'garrulous inanity'. The prohibition of madness takes 
place within language until Freud.  
  Foucault held in 1961 that there was a division within a 
prelapsarian  discourse  that  created  reason  and  madness 
through the exclusion of madness from language, but in 1964 
Foucault  maintains  that  the  prohibitions  of  madness  in 
language does not exclude madness from language but rather 
makes madness subject to a code of operation within language. 
In the fourth case of language prohibition, Foucault argues that 
Freud discovers madness as “the irruptive figure of a signifier 
that  is  absolutely  unlike  the  others.”  (Foucault  2006b,  MAO 
546) A signifier is still a sign, even if it is absolutely unlike all 
the others. Even if madness is not this strange signifier itself Seferin James / Derrida, Foucault and “Madness, the Absence of an Oeuvre” 
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but  the  difference  between  this  signifier  and  all  others  – 
madness is still manifesting at this signifier and it is not clear 
how  this  manifestation  of  meaning  in  association  with  a 
signifier  could  be  sharply  distinguished  from  ordinary 
associations  of  meaning  with  a  signifier.  Foucault  therefore 
withdraws  substantially  from  his  claim  that  madness  was 
silenced and excommunicated from language and that madness 
is the absence of an œuvre. 
  Historically, madness is no longer silenced for Foucault 
at the end of the Renaissance and the start of the classical age – 
a silencing associated with Descartes and the incarceration of 
the poor in the Great Confinement – but is instead silenced by 
Freud in the nineteenth century. If Freud is now responsible for 
the “[t]he caesura that establishes the distance between reason 
and  non-reason”  (Foucault  2006d,  xxviii),  then  Foucault  may 
find himself in the unenviable position of having engaged in the 
historical  study  of  the  wrong  historical  period  in  Folie  et 
déraison or, if Freud is to be considered the culmination of the 
caesura  rather  than  the  caesura  itself,  with  an  event,  if  this 
word  is  still  appropriate,  that  appears  to  last  for  centuries 
across hundreds of incidents. No longer really an event but an 
eventually. A difference weakened by the scale of centuries on 
which it must be grasped.  
 
5.  Working silence 
 
  Should “La folie, l'absence d'œuvre” be considered part of 
the  exchange  between  Derrida  and  Foucault?  It  has  been 
necessary  to  open  this  question  in  the  midst  of  an  uncertain 
silence.  A  silence  that  has  never  been  decisively  broken  by 
either Foucault or Derrida. There is a temptation to defer to 
these figures and their silence on this matter. To merely trace 
the possibility of a certain trajectory; remark the importance of 
an  apparent  absence  or  narrate  a  history  destined  to  remain 
suspended. Perhaps such a temptation will always remain but 
through my labour I have at least come to know my own mind 
on this matter.  
  In  this  paper  I  have  shown  that  Foucault's  “La  folie, 
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exchange  with  Derrida.  I  have  shown  that  it  fits  within  a 
clarified chronology of the exchange with Derrida and that the 
title of this 1964 paper is important in a number of ways for 
Foucault's  1961  book  Folie  et  déraison  (Foucault  1961)  and 
Derrida's 1963 paper “Cogito et histoire de la folie.” (Derrida 
1963) I have argued that MAO represents a change in position 
by Foucault on many of the key themes addressed by Derrida. 
Namely,  that  Foucault  sets  out  to  minimise  the  previous 
importance  of  his  initial  characterisation  of  madness  as  the 
absence of an œuvre and substantially alters his position on the 
relation between madness and language. Foucault dramatically 
shifts the locus of the exchange from Descartes to Freud with 
MAO and it is in relation to Freud that Derrida re-approaches 
Foucault's  Folie  et  déraison  in  1991  with  “'Etre  juste  avec 
Freud': l'histoire de la folie à l’âge psychanalytique.” In doing so 
Derrida  appears  to  silently  recognise  “La  folie,  l'absence 
d'œuvre” as a silent response by Foucault to “Cogito et histoire 
de la folie” and implicitly confirm its place within the exchange. 
  In any case, I am about to be evicted. I feel the silence 
coming for my last word.  
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1 This paper has been prepared for publication while in receipt of funding 
from the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences. 
2 “Derrida avait invité Foucault dans une lettre de 3 février” (Foucault 1994, 
25). 
3 Alan Bass makes a faithful translation from L’Écriture et la différence of this 
erroneous note (Derrida 1978, 437n).  
4 This note originally appeared in the very first publication in 1963 in Revue 
de  métaphysique  et  de  morale  (Derrida  1963,  460n).  The  note  is  then 
reproduced in 1967 in L’Écriture et la différence (Derrida 1967a, 51n). There 
are slight changes to this note between the 1963 and the 1967 versions but 
the material quoted remains the same so I have simply used the Alan Bass 
translation.  
5 Foucault had denied that the Greeks had a relationship to madness where 
as  Derrida  maintains  that  this  cannot  have  been  the  case.  Remi  Brague 
affirms Derrida against Foucault to argue that the Greeks had a relationship 
to madness (Brague 2002, 112). If the Greeks had a relationship to madness 
then this relationship would pre-date the violent event at the beginning of the 
classical age that is taken by Derrida to be the constitution of madness as 
such  for  Foucault.  Derrida  allows  that  reason  exists  in  particular  ways  in 
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particular historical periods but he does not allow reason to be reduced or 
limited  to  a  particular  historical  example  (this  is  in  keeping  with  the 
Husserlian resistance to psychologism and historicism of which Derrida was 
well aware).  
6 This statement appears in the 1967 edition as: “L'économie de cette écriture 
est un rapport réglé entre l'excédant et la totalité excédée: la différance de 
l'excès absolu” (Derrida 1967a, 96). 
7 Also note: “Foucault déchanta lorsque l'éditeur refusa de republier l'édition 
intégrale” (Foucault 1994, I, 26).  
8 Dits et écrits states that the first version of “Mon corps, ce papier, ce feu” 
titled  “Michel  Foucault  Derrida  e  no  kaino”  or  “Réponse  à  Derrida”  was 
published  as  an  article  in  the  Japanese  journal  Paideia  in  1972  (Foucault 
1994, I, 281). The “Michel Foucault Derrida e no kaino (Réponse à Derrida)” 
appears in French in volume II of Dits et écrits (Foucault 1994, II, 281-295).  
9 In 1976 a slightly different edition of Foucault's 1972 edition is published 
under the same title: Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique. The 1976 edition 
removes the two appendices, “La folie, l'absence d'œuvre” and “Mon corps, ce 
papier, ce feu,” added to the 1972 edition and the brief comments Foucault 
makes about these appendices in the 1972 preface. Scholars might consider it 
safe to ignore this publication as it adds nothing new to the text but the same 
rule would have applied to the 1964 edition and the dissemination of that 
version has had a marked influence on the historical reception of Foucault's 
text and the exchange with Derrida.  
10  The  choice  of  title  for  the translation  is  slightly  confusing  as  History  of 
Madness would be the most direct translation of the title of the abridged 1964 
edition Histoire de la folie whereas the 2006 translation is based on the 1972 
edition with the longer title Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique. The cause is 
likely that what Foucault terms the classical age is not the Greek and Roman 
period that this phrase connotes for English speaking readers but the period 
following the Renaissance.  
11 My thanks to Timothy Mooney for bringing Manfred Frank's comments on 
this matter to my attention. 
12 Perhaps Flynn is reacting against Flaherty's consideration of the exchange 
between Derrida and Foucault in terms of a disagreement over how to read 
Descartes (Flaherty 1986).  
13 I have been tempted to consider Foucault's 1964 abridgement of Folie et 
déraison  as  part  of  his  reaction  to  Derrida's  CHM.  The  case  for  such  an 
interpretation would have to be made on the basis of Foucault's rather precise 
removal of his discussion of Descartes at the start of the second chapter and 
removal of the rhetorical question and answer concerning the characterisation 
of madness as the absence of an œuvre from the 1961 Preface and Foucault's 
subsequent reformulation of these respective themes in MAO and “Mon corps, 
ce papier, ce feu.” Against such an interpretation would be the fact that the 
abridgement was reluctantly undertaken by Foucault in order to prepare a 
popular edition for his editors (see note 6) and the relevant materials were 
removed alongside many of no relevance to Derrida's argumentation.  
14 This sense of madness as the absence of an œuvre is interesting because a 
group of people with this ambiguous relationship to the means of production 
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who are clearly subject to political and juridical power marks a potential point 
of departure from Marx in Foucault's early work. 
15  This  is  why  Foucault's  work  is  only  separated  from  madness  by  a 
transparent sheet for Derrida (cf. Wood 2009, 47). 
16 Note that in the Alan Bass translation Derrida quotes the last part of this 
passage as “The calcinated root of meaning” (Derrida 1978, 41).  
17 I am thinking especially of the discussion of différance in the chapter titled 
“La voix qui garde le silence” (Derrida 1967b, 78-97). 
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